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[Excerpt] Among the fraudulent contracting of work practices, one of the most difficult to identify is the 
creation of sham companies (usually, in another country). Sham companies are essentially new entities 
created to disguise the real employer. 
Creating a company, even abroad, is – of course – legal and may well be institutionally and economically 
advisable. However, when the only purpose of its creation is to benefit from more favourable regulations 
relating to labour and tax (and not to develop an activity in the country), then questions should be asked 
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The Eurofound study Exploring the fraudulent contracting of work in the European Union emphasises that 
the term ‘sham contracting’ or ‘sham companies’ embraces a diversity of fraudulent practices, embedded 
in different institutional contexts (Eurofound, 2016a).1 Fraudulent practices are perpetrated for different 
purposes, the most important of which are to avoid paying, or to save, employment-related taxes and 
social security contributions, and to evade employers’ liability towards employees. Beyond some recent 
analysis of ‘letter-box’ companies,2 there is not much research into sham contracting or sham 
companies. In addition, EU legislation has not played any role in this respect. 
Sham companies share the common goal of disguising the real employer. This can be achieved through 
different mechanisms such as: 
• the creation of companies without assets, generally within subcontracting chains 
• commercial or civil law contracts between companies where employees are 
misrepresented as contractors or company owners 
• workers’ cooperatives, where workers lack actual control over the organisation’s 
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Introduction 
Among the fraudulent contracting of work practices, one of the most difficult to identify is the 
creation of sham companies (usually,  in another country). Sham companies are essentially 
new entities created to disguise the real employer. 
Creating a company, even abroad, is – of course – legal and may well be institutionally and 
economically advisable. However, when the only purpose of its creation is to benefit from 
more favourable regulations relating to labour and tax (and not to develop an activity in the 
country), then questions should be asked about the ‘genuine’ nature of the company. 
The Eurofound study Exploring the fraudulent contracting of work in the European Union 
emphasises that the term ‘sham contracting’ or ‘sham companies’ embraces a diversity of 
fraudulent practices, embedded in different institutional contexts (Eurofound, 2016a).
1
 
Fraudulent practices are perpetrated for different purposes, the most important of which are to 
avoid paying, or to save, employment-related taxes and social security contributions, and to 
evade employers’ liability towards employees. Beyond some recent analysis of ‘letter-box’ 
companies,
2
 there is not much research into sham contracting or sham companies. In addition, 
EU legislation has not played any role in this respect. 
Sham companies share the common goal of disguising the real employer. This can be 
achieved through different mechanisms such as: 
 the creation of companies without assets, generally within subcontracting chains 
 commercial or civil law contracts between companies where employees are 
misrepresented as contractors or company owners 
 workers’ cooperatives, where workers lack actual control over the organisation’s 
decisions. 
  
                                                     
1
 The term ‘bogus company’ is also used to cover illicit or illegal situations where enterprises without 
any assets or actual entrepreneurial activities are created, with the goal of laundering money coming 
from illegal activities. This information sheet does not consider these practices, limiting its coverage to 
legal activities. 
2
 See, for instance Cremers (2014) and references therein. 
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National definitions of sham companies 
The way sham companies are created makes it particularly difficult to identify them and so 
understand their full impact. The three countries under discussion in this information sheet 
(Austria, Estonia and Italy) display considerable diversity in their definitions of sham 
companies and in their attempts to combat these practices.  
In Austria, the term ‘sham’ or ‘bogus’ companies (Scheinfirmen) refers to companies without 
assets (that is, letter-box companies, often with registered offices in empty basements or 
storage rooms). These serve the purpose only of registering employees with social security 
institutions, without the intention of paying any taxes or social security contributions: they 
thus perpetrate a systematic social fraud.
3
 They are usually involved in ‘subcontracting 
pyramids’ (extended chains of subcontractors) and in extended corporate networks (at 
transnational level, too). 
Sham companies operate as follows: companies are established, employees are registered, and 
after a certain period of time – once the subcontract has been fully executed, the starting 
capital concealed and the managers have resigned – the company declares itself bankrupt. As 
a result, the company avoids paying social security contributions and taxes. As there is no 
capital left, the state cannot claim contributions and taxes from these insolvent companies 
(Winter-Ebmer et al, 2013). Workers registered by bogus companies may either not work at 
all (or work in the shadow economy), or work for a company higher up in the subcontracting 
chain. According to the Federal Economic Chamber (WKÖ), the large majority of bogus 
companies develop entrepreneurial activities; they are companies whose workers are actually 
working, in performing a working activity for a company that is different from the sham 
company. 
In Estonia, sham contracting is related to practices where direct employment contracts are 
hidden behind civil law contracts or service agreements that imply the creation of bogus 
private limited companies (OÜ-tamine), with the purpose of evading employment-related 
taxes, including social security contributions. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Estonia stipulate that service agreements between companies are considered employment 
relationships if one company (that is, the people who are acting as a private limited company) 
performs a working activity for the other company in the framework of a relationship of 
subordination to the latter’s management and under the latter’s control (EMTA, 2015). 
Other features that, according to court decisions, provide a basis for qualifying service 
agreements between companies as employment contracts or authorisation agreements, and 
also falling under the category of civil law contracts between a company and a natural person 
are as follows: 
 the company providing the service issues invoices to the recipient that are for the same 
amount every month 
 the company provides services only or mostly to a single client 
 the person who provides the service is also member of the management board of the 
company that receives the service 
 the service agreement features elements typical of employment contracts (for example, 
fixed working time or control exercised by the employer) (Ärileht, 2015). 
In Italy, the issue mainly takes the form of bogus workers’ cooperatives. A cooperative is a 
specific kind of company that has a ‘mutual purpose’, generally intended as the satisfaction of 
its members’ common needs. The activities of the cooperatives should respect the values of 
the cooperative movement, including democratic member control and members’ economic 
participation. For this reason, rules applying to cooperatives include provisions such as a per 
capita vote at assemblies, limits on the distribution of dividends and the possibility of 
                                                     
3
 ‘Social fraud’ is the non-payment of social contributions and/or taxes. 
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distributing a share of the surplus according to the amount of work undertaken by each 
member (the so-called ‘patronage dividend’, ristorno). A workers’ cooperative member is, 
therefore, both one of the owners and a worker of the company. Bearing this in mind, frauds 
are related to situations where workers do not exercise any influence over the decisions of the 
company. Rather, decisions are centralised within a managerial group, which protects its own 
interests. In reality, then, the cooperative acts as a private company, with one or more 
managers behaving as the employers. 
Fraud is also associated with cases where the cooperative is in reality a branch of the main 
client (usually the only client) and is directed by it, despite the client being formally involved 
only in a subcontracting agreement. While doing so, the actual employer aims to bypass 
liability for wages, social security contributions and other duties characterising employment 
relationships.  
Furthermore, cooperatives can lawfully reduce pay by means of assembly decisions in the 
case of ‘crisis’ and adjudicate on other aspects concerning the employment relationship with 
their members in their statutes and internal regulations. While these possibilities are legal for 
cooperatives, the choice of this structure with the only aim being to reduce workers’ rights is 
fraudulent. 
Apart from abuses of these provisions, directly linked to the legal status of cooperatives, there 
are many other ways in which bogus cooperatives circumvent the applicable minimum wages, 
employment conditions and social security contributions. These frauds are reported in relation 
to other legal entities; however, the legal status of cooperatives provides actual employers 
with a ‘shield’ in case of inspections or lawsuits. The most discussed phenomenon is the 
application of collective agreements signed by less representative social partners or even by 
social partners existing only on paper (so-called ‘pirate contracts’), thus legitimising 
companies to stick to less onerous employment conditions than those set out by the most 
representative social partners. 
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Difficulty of assessing scale of problem 
Quantitative data are not fully available for fraudulent practices in general. Estimates become 
even more difficult in the case of sham companies, given the need to take into account a 
number of factors. 
In Austria, sham companies have featured prominently in political discussions as they have 
become a greater problem: a new law introduced in 2016 is specifically targeted at combating 
such companies (Act against Social Fraud – Sozialbetrugsbekämpfungsgesetz, SBBG; see 
below). The use of sham companies is prevalent in the construction sector, but also in the 
cleaning and small transport sectors. These sectors share several characteristics, such as being 
labour intensive and involving work that cannot be delocalised but has to take place on site. 
According to the stakeholders interviewed, registered employees of bogus companies belong 
to all age groups, with an overrepresentation of workers with a migrant background. Often, 
they are migrant workers and cross-border workers from Member States that joined the EU 
after 2004. Depending on the sector, both male and female workers are involved. While the 
cleaning sector is female dominated, the construction sector is male dominated, with a high 
prevalence of blue-collar workers. In most cases, but not all, the workers are aware that they 
are hired by a bogus company. The occupations in which they are employed are generally 
those requiring low-level qualifications. However, in the construction sector, the phenomenon 
also affects skilled workers, such as metalworkers and workers in the dry construction 
segment. 
In Estonia, there are no reliable estimates enabling the sectors where the phenomenon is more 
widespread to be identified. However, the interviewees from the Estonian Labour Inspectorate 
and the Estonian Trade Union Confederation (EAKL) pointed to two crucial practices that 
have gained public attention. First, in public procurement procedures for transport services, 
there have been cases in which bids have been assessed as unreasonably low, leading to 
suspected use of bogus self-employment or service contracts to hire bus drivers. Second, there 
have been cases in which a board member of a company provides management services to the 
same company, under a service agreement between companies. In this case too, there are 
many ways to pay lower taxes (and social security contributions). 
There is no information available on how many companies could be implementing fraudulent 
practices. In 2015, more than 23,000 companies (almost 25% of all companies) did not pay 
labour taxes; however, this figure also includes inactive companies and those without 
employees (EMTA, 2015). 
In Italy, the issue of bogus cooperatives is a recognised political problem, especially 
widespread in the construction and tertiary sectors. In the tertiary sector, cooperatives are 
usually active in logistics, accommodation and large-scale retail trade, as well as in other 
services to enterprises (especially cleaning, reception, private surveillance and porterage for 
hotels and tourist villages) and for public administration (welfare services). Workers in bogus 
cooperatives are often migrants. 
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Drivers and enablers of fraudulent practice 
Among the drivers, avoiding costs and employers’ obligations are the most relevant. In terms 
of enabling factors, lack of clarity of regulation, the difficulties of control and the 
vulnerability of the workers are of concern. 
Drivers – reducing costs and avoiding liability 
One of the main objectives of the creation of a sham company is reducing costs – principally, 
saving on social security and employment-related taxes. For instance, Austrian sham 
companies are used in subcontracting chains to save costs, these companies not paying any 
employment taxes or social security contributions. Similarly, Italian cooperatives benefit 
from favourable taxation regulations, especially when most of the activities are performed by 
their members (cooperative a mutualità prevalente), or when they are registered as ‘social 
cooperatives’ (cooperatives managing social and educational services or the employment of 
disadvantaged people). This favourable taxation context, then, encourages fraudulent 
practices. In Estonia, the considerable differences between labour and corporate taxes lead to 
companies disguising employment by contracting work through civil law contracts and 
private limited companies. In some cases, employees (for instance, board members) may also 
be interested in providing services to a company through their own private limited company, 
instead of entering into an employment contract: in these cases, employment-related taxes 
need not be paid and the entire remuneration is paid directly to the private limited company. 
The owners of the latter can then decide how much they will keep for themselves as a salary 
and how much they will pay out as dividends; there is considerable leeway and no 
transparency about the distribution. However, it can have a considerable impact on taxes and 
public finances. 
In all three countries, the aim of fraud is also to avoid liability with regard to employees in 
terms of such aspects as remuneration, working time, annual leave, health and safety, and/or 
social security contributions. 
Enabling factors: institutional features and vulnerability of workers 
Institutional factors are more important in Italy than in Austria and Estonia in terms of 
enabling this type of fraud – notably, the lack of clarity of existing regulation. In Italy, legal 
provisions concerning outsourcing hamper the proper sanctioning of frauds. As rephrased by 
Legislative Decree 276/2003 (the ‘Biagi Law’), the criteria identifying a sham company are 
quite vague, only requiring proof that ‘the actual employer organises the means of production 
of the subcontractor and runs the business risk’. Before the reform, the ‘ownership’ of the 
means of production was sufficient to identify the real employer. In addition, the ‘Jobs Act’ 
(Eurofound, 2015) removed from criminal law the ‘fraudulent labour intermediation’, which 
sought to punish intermediation aimed at ‘avoiding the application of compulsory law or 
collective bargaining provisions’. As a consequence, this has limited the power of inspectors 
to rule on the hiring of workers fraudulently employed through a bogus cooperative. The 
ambiguities of the legislation – along with a limited number of inspectors and consequently 
inspections – create significant problems of enforcement. 
In Austria also, the use of subcontracting chains or subcontracting pyramids is considered a 
general practice, as public authorities face difficulties in removing sham companies from the 
market. However, as indicated above (and unlike Italy), the legal framework has been 
significantly reshaped in an attempt to reduce the possibility of implementing long 
subcontracting chains and to improve controls over sham companies. 
Finally, attention should be drawn to how the vulnerability of the workers can enable this 
kind of fraud. In Italy, members of bogus cooperatives, especially if they are migrants not 
familiar with the Italian language, are often unaware of their contractual position towards the 
cooperative, and of the legal framework covering cooperatives and of the rights this entails 
(such as participation in assemblies). In contrast, in Austria, where a significant share of the 
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workers employed in bogus companies have a migrant background, those interviewed said 
that they are usually aware of the fraud. Nevertheless, given their weaker bargaining power 
and lack of alternative employment opportunities, they accept the situation. Furthermore, the 
roles and competencies of trade unions, acting for and representing  workers, are brought into 
question by these ‘sham constructions’. 
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Consequences of fraudulent practice 
Impact on business competition 
No specific effects on business competition in Estonia were systematically reported, beyond 
a mention that fraudulent forms of contracting work could affect fair business competition, as 
labour costs depend on whether the worker is formally employed or hired under a civil 
contract. 
The creation of sham companies and their effect on competition are more obvious when 
subcontracting is also involved. In Austria, it has been noted that sham companies are very 
often part of pyramids of subcontracting chains. Principal contractors never subcontract part 
of the work to a sham company directly, as they are themselves checked thoroughly before a 
contract is awarded. Principal contractors are, however, fully aware that a few steps further 
down the subcontracting chain, sham companies are used because otherwise the business 
would no longer be profitable. According to WKÖ, companies in the ancillary building trade 
argue that principal contractors push them to save costs, thus encouraging them to subcontract 
to bogus companies. Competition between companies becomes even fiercer with the use of 
sham companies. Not all companies participate, but those that do not face a significant 
competitive disadvantage. Fraudulent behaviour thus has a considerable effect on business 
competition. Large, industrial enterprises are usually among the ‘winners’, whereas the losers 
are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) further down the subcontracting chain. 
In Italy, one of the main cooperatives’ organisations, the National Association of 
Cooperatives and Benefit Societies, noted that bogus cooperatives have two negative effects. 
First, they bring about social dumping and unfair competition, especially by authorising 
saving on labour costs. Second, the practice of signing ‘pirate contracts’ damages the 
credibility of all cooperatives. 
According to the representative from the Italian Joint National Committee for Building 
Workers’ Welfare FundsCNCE (the main paritarian institution of the construction sector), the 
company at the top of the subcontracting chain does not necessarily subcontract work to 
bogus cooperatives in order to save costs, but rather might be unaware of the employment 
conditions applied by its subcontractors and lack any control over them. A cumulative trend 
has been noted, with bogus cooperatives being likely to commit other frauds in terms of the 
quality of the materials used or by employing a workforce that lacks the necessary skills, with 
obvious consequences on work quality and competitiveness. 
Impact on working conditions and workers’ rights 
In the three countries covered by this information sheet, workers employed in bogus 
companies generally experience poorer working conditions in terms of wages, working time 
or health and safety. However, as the term ‘bogus company’ embraces different fraudulent 
practices, the process through which these negative effects are produced differs. 
In Austria, employees of a subcontracting company – even a sham one – do not usually 
experience wage dumping to a large extent, as collective agreements are generally complied 
with. Nonetheless, as WKÖ points out, fraudulent practices – operating beyond the reach of 
regulation – lead to reduced incomes. For instance, declared wages do not correspond to the 
amounts actually received. Workers in sham companies are often forced to give back a share 
of their pay in cash. According to an inspector from the Vienna Local Insurance Fund 
(Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse, WGKK), this share can amount to as much as two-thirds of the 
pay. Moreover, in the specific case of the construction sector, bogus companies may avoid 
paying contributions to the sectoral fund in charge of intermediating a number of wage 
elements, including holiday pay and severance pay, which are therefore denied to the workers 
in question. In addition, if sham companies become insolvent (which they usually do) and any 
wages are outstanding, the latter end up being borne by taxpayers, as these are eventually paid 
by the Insolvency Payment Fund (Insolvenzentgeltfonds). Frauds involving pay may also 
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entail contracts displaying shorter hours than those actually worked. Negative effects on 
working time were also highlighted in the interviews. Practice shows that workers in sham 
companies often work longer hours and enjoy few rest breaks. As a consequence, proneness 
to work-related accidents increases strongly. 
In Estonia, entering into a contract with a private limited company – rather than establishing 
a labour contract with an employee – allows the company to bypass all the regulations on 
employee remuneration, working time, annual leave, and health and safety, as in cases where 
workers are contracted as self-employed. Here, the stakeholders interviewed pointed out that 
civil contracts, as with employment contracts, sometimes contain provisions on working time 
(for instance, they specify the daily time span within which workers are supposed to perform 
their working activities). This example points to cases in which companies avoid entering into 
proper employment relationships but still seek to control the working process. It also 
highlights that civil contracts sometimes set out a service price that is below the national 
minimum wage, as stipulated by collective bargaining agreements (which are not applicable 
outside employment relationships). According to a labour inspector, the issue of occupational 
health and safety is the most crucial in terms of working conditions. There is no systematic 
information on differences in occupational health and safety conditions between workers 
under ‘civil law contracts’ and workers in ‘employment contracts’; nevertheless, various 
elements show that people under civil law contracts are less protected in this regard, as the 
owner of a site has fewer legal obligations towards them. In addition, entitlement to social 
security benefits is hampered because the coverage enjoyed by a self-employed worker or 
owner of a private limited company is much less than that enjoyed by an employee. 
In Italy, depending on the different types of fraud implemented, workers can have a wide 
range of rights negated, mainly in terms of wages, paid leave, protection against dismissals 
and the safeguarding of health and safety at work. The enjoyment of these rights can be 
diminished when employees are covered by rules set out by assembly decisions, statutes or 
pirate contracts that establish less favourable working conditions. For instance, in some cases 
the statutes of bogus cooperatives were found to suspend members’ right to continue working 
during pregnancy. The possibility of recovering loss of pay by means of tribunals is also 
discouraged. In particular, the interviewee from the Italian Federation of Workers in the 
Trade, Tourism and Service Sectors (FILCAMS) stressed that there are cases of migrant 
workers being moved from one cooperative to another. While doing so, they are asked to sign 
statements by which they waive all their previous rights in terms of unpaid wages, in 
exchange for a small lump-sum payment. And, as in Austria, bogus cooperatives may also 
fraudulently go bankrupt in order to avoid paying wages and social security contributions to 
the National Institute of Social Security (INPS). When this happens, workers have a very 
limited chance of receiving the wages owed to them, and INPS may incur losses because of 
unpaid contributions. 
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Measures to address issue 
A variety of actions have been taken in the three countries – regulatory reforms, social 
partners initiatives and court cases. 
Policy reforms 
Austria directly addresses the issue of bogus companies through the Act against Social Fraud 
(Sozialbetrugsbekämpfungsgesetz, SBBG), effective from 1 January 2016. This act aims at 
simplifying the identification and punishment of bogus companies’ liability as contractors. A 
variety of measures is displayed, addressing faster procedure, transparency and impacts on the 
workers. 
The act envisages an accelerated procedure to identify and prosecute bogus companies faster. 
It works as follows. When there is reasonable suspicion that an undertaking is a bogus 
company, it is informed in writing. The company then has one week to file an objection. If an 
objection is put forward, the authorities investigate with a view to determining whether the 
undertaking concerned is bogus; if no objection is made, the authorities automatically rule 
that the undertaking concerned is a bogus company. The Ministry of Finance makes a list of 
bogus companies available online; once placed on the list, registration of employees at the 
company is no longer possible.  
This online list also informs contracting companies which potential subcontractors are, in 
fact, bogus, and assumes that they will take this into account when hiring subcontractors. If a 
contracting company hires a bogus subcontractor, the former is also held liable as the 
guarantor and payer of employees’ wage claims and social security contributions. 
Employees registered with companies found to be bogus are summoned by health insurance 
authorities and are obliged to cooperate. If they do not show up within six weeks, their 
insurance coverage ceases retroactively as of the day when the undertaking was declared a 
bogus company. If these employees can credibly demonstrate that they have performed work 
for the bogus company, health insurance authorities are required to investigate the employer. 
Should this not be possible, the contractor that engaged the bogus company is considered to 
be the rightful employer if it is, or should have been, aware that the subcontractor is a bogus 
company and if it cannot prove that the latter’s employees have not done work for it. 
Employees are entitled to outstanding wage claims if they can provide credible proof, for 
example, by producing documentation – such as the employment contract. 
Within the framework of the Fraud Prevention Act 2010 (Betrugsbekämpfungsgesetz, 
BBKG), customers’ liability has been also extended to wage-dependent levies. This means 
that, if building work is being subcontracted to another company, the customer is liable for all 
wage-dependent levies that the subcontracted company is to pay, up to a maximum of 5% of 
the wages paid. According to the SBBG, the liability of contractors is increased as they are 
now considered both guarantors and payers. 
The recent implementation of the SBBG means that it is not possible to assess its impact 
based on reliable research, administrative data or case law. Although all the interviewees 
deemed the act as highly relevant, evaluations of its expected impact differed. Interviewees 
from the Construction Workers’ Annual Leave and Severance Pay Fund (Bauarbeiter-
Urlaubs- und Abfertigungskasse, BUAK) claimed that their organisation had already achieved 
some positive results against bogus companies. They felt that absolute transparency on 
contracted companies and their trades, as well as on employees and their working times, 
would greatly facilitate the supervision and monitoring activities implemented by BUAK and 
other institutions. The WKÖ representative, on the other hand, was not very optimistic that 
the act would eradicate the use of sham companies as they are usually ‘forced’ into 
insolvency and a new one is founded immediately afterwards. All this happens faster than 
inspection procedures and the publication of an ad hoc list on a dedicated website. Founding a 
company, or even 10 at the same time, is both straightforward and legal.  
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In Italy, the parliament is examining two legal proposals, following campaigns by the social 
partners. These are the Charter of Workers’ Universal Rights, backed by the Italian General 
Confederation of Work (CGIL), and a bill to tackle bogus cooperatives, backed by the main 
organisations representing cooperatives. The charter includes provisions aimed at ensuring 
equal treatment between the workers of the client and of subcontractors in the case of 
subcontracting of a production phase, and strengthening the applicability of rules set by 
collective bargaining for all employers, including rules limiting the possibility of 
subcontracting specific activities. The bill aims to make inspections of the mutual purpose of 
cooperatives more targeted and to increase sanctions for cooperatives that refuse to undergo 
inspections or are found to not comply with cooperatives’ values. 
Social partners’ initiatives have also been launched in Austria and Italy. In Austria, the Fair 
Procurement! (Faire Vergaben!) campaign by 3 trade unions and 14 sectoral employers’ 
groups had a considerable influence on the recent amendment to the Federal Public 
Procurement Act (Bundesvergabegesetz, BVergG). The amendment, which came into force 
on 1 March 2016, introduced several improvements: 
 mandatory ‘best bidder’ principle on public building contracts of more than €1 million 
 definition of ‘core services’: core services can be determined in public tenders and must be 
provided by the main contractor (they cannot be subcontracted – previously, 99.9% of a 
contract could be subcontracted) 
 transparency on subcontracting: subcontractors must be included in the offer, and they will 
be checked and approved (if further subcontracting parties are added or changed, they 
also need to be approved) 
 combating wage and social dumping: if more than two offences are registered within 12 
months, contractors are excluded from future public procurement procedures. 
In Italy, the main measure to fight bogus cooperatives is the setting up, under a memorandum 
of understanding signed in 2007, of the National Observatory on Cooperatives, composed of 
social partners and government representatives. Similar structured observatories have also 
been set up at local branches of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (Territorial Labour 
Office). The purpose of these bodies is to provide advice on inspections with a view to 
ensuring the application of sectoral collective agreements signed by the most representative 
social partners, as well as in relation to the planning and direction of inspections. According 
to the representatives of the Italian Federation of Workers in the Trade, Tourism and Service 
Sectors (Filcams) and the National League of Cooperatives and Mutuals (Legacoop), the 
activities of the observatories have yielded very different results due to the lack of inspections 
in some areas of the country. 
In Estonia, recent concrete measures to tackle bogus private limited companies are related to 
case law developments. The Supreme Court of Estonia has made three decisions (nos. 3-3-1-
12-15, 3-3-1-25-15 and 3-2-1-82-14) supporting the position of the Estonian Tax and 
Customs Board (EMTA) (Eurofound, 2016b). These decisions stipulated that service 
agreements between companies are considered employment relationships if one company 
(that is, the people who are acting as a private limited company) performs work for the other 
company in the framework of a relationship of subordination to the latter’s management and 
under the latter’s control (EMTA, 2015). Therefore, when an actual employment relationship 
is hidden behind a service agreement between companies with the purpose of evading 
employment-related taxes, EMTA is now empowered to redefine those agreements as 
employment contracts, obliging the companies to pay employment-related taxes. EMTA has 
announced that it would possibly contact those companies that allegedly use fraudulent 
schemes and ask them to change their practices. Most are small companies, but EMTA has 
stated that it would start with larger companies whose tax payments would give higher 
revenue (Õepa, 2015). So far, EMTA has contacted around 200 companies, as against the 
overall 23,000 companies (not all fraudulent) that are not paying employment-related taxes. 
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Policy pointers 
In addition to well-known measures, such as running preventive awareness-raising campaigns 
and increasing systematic fines, there should be a greater focus on targeting sham 
companies through rules on procurement and subcontracting. 
Public procurement: Responsible public procurement, including labour clauses or 
requirements on direct employment, can be used to set an example and so reduce bogus 
contracting, especially in sectors such as construction. 
Subcontracting chains: Rules on subcontracting should neutralise the possibility of making 
profits by applying unfair working conditions.  
A number of aspects should be considered, including the strategic role of social partners in 
setting the ‘rules of the game’ at multiemployer level, the regulation of joint liabilities 
between the client and subcontractors, and criteria to identify and punish the real employer. 
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